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Abstract When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they
exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how
of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct
an ‘‘active mutual enablement’’ (AME) account of this relationship, according to
which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and
make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent,
while actively enabling the other to make such adjustments. I defend the AME
account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an
examination of the reducibility (or otherwise) of joint know-how to joint proposi-
tional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is
incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowl-
edge, whereas a distributive account is not (although serious difficulties for any such
reduction remain). I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account
brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint know-
how.
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1 Introduction
Collaboration in pursuit of joint goals is a ubiquitous aspect of human lives, and it
was fundamental to the social foraging of our Palaeolithic ancestors. Yet it seems
absent from the social lives of our fellow great apes. As the primatologist Michael
Tomasello has remarked, ‘‘it is inconceivable that you would ever see two
chimpanzees carrying a log together’’.1 Chimpanzees cooperate, but their cooper-
ation takes the form of the pursuit of individual goals that happen to align. For
example, two or more chimpanzees may hunt a monkey at the same time, but each is
merely pursuing the prey individually: there is, Tomasello argues, no joint goal in
these cases, and no conceiving of individual actions as means to that goal
(Tomasello 2014).
This points to a central role for joint action in the story of human evolution
(Sterelny 2012; Tomasello 2014, 2016). For this reason and others, recent decades
have seen growing interest across various disciplines in the basic psychological
structures underlying joint action, often under the broad heading of joint or shared
intentionality. Most work in this area falls into one of two traditions. First, there are
attempts to capture, at the personal level, the nature of the propositional attitudes
possessed by the agents in a joint action, and in particular the nature of the
intentions they execute. A landmark in this area is Michael Bratman’s
(1992, 1993, 2014) theory of shared intention, on which, roughly speaking, a
shared intention consists of a package of individual intentions which interlock in a
characteristic way.2 Second, there are attempts to capture, at the subpersonal level,
the cognitive and neural mechanisms implicated in the skilful control of a joint
action. A landmark in this area is Cordula Vesper and colleagues’ minimal cognitive
architecture for joint action, which highlights mechanisms of prediction, monitor-
ing, and ‘‘coordination smoothing’’ (Vesper et al. 2010).3 The two traditions often
feel rather loosely connected: in principle, accounts of joint intention and accounts
of subpersonal cognitive mechanisms should be mutually constraining and mutually
informing; but in practice they have been pursued independently, and it is not
always clear how they constrain and inform each other. There is a need in the joint
action literature for a bridging theory: a theory of how the agent’s subpersonal
mechanisms constrain and guide the joint intentional actions in which the agent can
participate.
In the case of individual action, the gap between theories of intention and of
subpersonal action control can be bridged by a theory of know-how. While there is
currently little agreement as to the nature of know-how, all sides can agree that
know-how plays a useful bridging role in a theory of action: know-how is a
personal-level state which arises from subpersonal mechanisms of skilful action
control, and which constrains and guides the agent’s intentional actions. In much the
1 Quoted in Stix (2014, p. 77).
2 For alternative theories of joint intention, see Gilbert (1989, 2000), Tuomela and Miller (1988),
Tuomela (1995, 2007) and Schweikard and Schmid (2013).
3 See also Sebanz et al. (2006), Sebanz and Knoblich (2009) and Knoblich et al. (2011).
J. Birch
123
same way, the gap between theories of joint intention and of subpersonal
mechanisms of joint action control can be bridged by a theory of joint know-how.
Just as individual intentional action exercises individual know-how, joint action
typically exercises joint know-how.4 When two people intentionally carry a log
together, they exercise joint knowledge of how to carry to a log together. When two
people dance the quickstep, without stepping on each other’s toes or otherwise
appearing badly coordinated, they exercise joint knowledge of how to dance the
quickstep. When two people row a coxless pair, moving smoothly through the water
without veering from side to side, they exercise joint knowledge of how to row
together (my focal example in this paper, illustrated in Fig. 1 by Thomas Eakins’s
painting, ‘‘The Biglin Brothers Racing’’). In each case, the agents’ joint know-how
depends on their subpersonal mechanisms and guides their joint intentional actions,
suggesting an important place for a theory of joint know-how within an overarching
theory of joint action.
For different reasons, epistemologists should also want a theory of joint know-
how. One of the most visible debates in recent epistemology concerns the
reducibility, or otherwise, of individual know-how to individual propositional
knowledge.5 The view that know-how is reducible in this way is known as
intellectualism about know-how. One can pose an analogous question in the joint
case: does joint know-how reduce to joint knowledge of a proposition? If we can
construct adequate accounts of joint know-how and joint propositional knowledge
on which the former turns out to reduce to the latter, the intellectualist will be able
to offer a unified account of know-how applicable to both the individual case and
the joint case. That will be a mark in its favour. By contrast, if the intellectualist
cannot plausibly account for joint know-how as a species of joint propositional
knowledge, that is a mark against intellectualism in the individual case too, since it
seems reasonable to assume (as a working hypothesis) that joint and individual
know-how are not fundamentally different kinds of state, one with propositional
content and the other without.
My goal is this paper is to begin the groundwork for a theory of joint know-how
by examining the relationship between joint and individual know-how in paradigm
cases of joint action. My question, in short, is the following: in such cases, what is
the relationship between the know-how exercised jointly by the two cooperating
agents and the know-how each agent individually exercises? For example, what
does it take, in regard to the agents’ individual know-how, for two agents to know
how to row a coxless pair together? I will set out some basic constraints on an
acceptable answer to this question (Sect. 2), argue that a simple account does not
meet the constraints (Sect. 3), and construct and defend a more complex account
(the ‘‘active mutual enablement’’ or AME account) that does (Sects. 4–6). The
thought behind the AME account is that, just as joint intention (for Bratman)
4 I leave open the possibility that some cases of joint action do not exercise joint know-how. This may be
true of cases of ‘‘prepackaged cooperation’’ in Bratman’s (1992) sense. This possibility is discussed at the
end of Sect. 2 in the main text.
5 For recent introductions to the debate, see Fridland (2015) and Pavese (2016). See the papers collected
in Bengson and Moffett (2011) for a sense of the main positions.
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consists in a complex structure of individual intentions with interlocking objects,
joint know-how likewise consists in a complex structure of individual know-how
states with interlocking objects.
To be clear, a theory of the relation between joint know-how and individual
know-how is not a complete theory of joint know-how, because it does not provide a
theory of the intrinsic nature of know-how. It is best viewed as providing a detailed
set of constraints on any unified theory of know-how that aims to encompass both
the individual and joint cases. Any such theory, whatever it says about the intrinsic
nature of know-how, must be such as to preserve the relation between individual
and joint know-how captured by the AME account. I will argue, however, that this
presents important obstacles to the development of an intellectualist theory of joint
know-how (Sect. 7). One account of joint propositional knowledge (a summativist
account, on which a pair of agents knows only what both agents individually know)
is incompatible with any such reduction (Sect. 8). A different account of joint
propositional knowledge (a distributive account, on which two agents can jointly
know propositions that neither individually knows) is more conducive to the
reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge (Sect. 9), but
significant problems for such a reduction remain, and they push an aspiring
intellectualist about joint know-how to embrace a substantial decoupling of joint
knowledge from individual belief (Sect. 10).
My focus here will be on simple, two-agent cases, such as rowing a coxless pair. I
will not consider larger ‘‘group agents’’ (such as corporations and institutions) of the
sort discussed by List and Pettit (2011), nor will I consider cases of cooperation
among large numbers of individual agents. I start with simple cases because my aim
is to undertake the groundwork for a theory of joint know-how, and I take it to be in
Fig. 1 Thomas Eakins, ‘‘The Biglin Brothers Racing’’, 1872. John Biglin sits in the stern seat (on the left
of the painting); Barney Biglin sits in the bow seat (on the right of the painting). Public domain
reproduction courtesy of the National Gallery of Art, Washington, DC
J. Birch
123
two-agent cases that the relation between individual and joint know-how is easiest
to apprehend (cf. Bratman 2014 on joint intention). Nevertheless, my hope is that
the account constructed here will scale-up to at least some cases of larger scale
cooperation. I will comment very briefly on this issue in the conclusion (Sect. 11).
2 Three constraints
Before building a positive account of the relation between joint and individual
know-how, it will help to put in place a simple framework and some basic
constraints. Suppose two agents, S1 and S2, undertake a joint action J. Suppose the
structure of J is such that each agent has a well-defined role, consisting of an
individual action or series of actions that they must perform individually if J is to be
performed jointly. This may not be true of all joint actions, but I take it to be true of
paradigm cases. Consider, for example, the Biglin brothers rowing a coxless pair
together: the role of John Biglin is to row in the stern seat, and the role of Barney
Biglin is to row in the bow seat. The assignment of roles to agents is fixed, once they
have taken their seats. Let us denote the roles adopted by S1 and S2, respectively, as
j1 and j2.
The first constraint, Distribution, is the following:
Distribution: If S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J, it need not be true, of
either agent, that he individually knows how to perform both roles in J.6
The example of the Biglin brothers intuitively motivates this constraint. For two
agents to know how to row a coxless pair together, it need not be the case that both
agents know how to row in both seats. It may be that one knows how to row in the
bow seat, the other knows how to row in the stern seat, and neither knows how to
row in the favoured position of the other.
The second constraint, Tether, demands that joint know-how is nevertheless
constrained by the agents’ individual know-how. For example, if we have two
agents, neither of which knows how to row in either seat of a coxless pair, regardless
of the circumstances, then it cannot be true of this pair of agents that they know how
to row a coxless pair together. That is:
Tether: If neither S1 nor S2 knows how to perform any of the roles in J under
any conditions, then S1 and S2 do not jointly know how to do J.
To be clear, Tether should not be read as requiring, of either agent, that he knows
how to perform his role in the absence of the other agent. This would be too strong a
requirement. Consider, for example, two agents lifting a log: they may know how to
lift the log together by lifting one side each, even though, owing to the weight of the
log, neither agent knows how to lift his side in the absence of the other. What Tether
should be read as requiring is that at least one agent knows how to do at least one of
6 Throughout this article, I use male pronouns for the sake of continuity with my central example of the
Biglin brothers.
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the roles in J in at least one set of conditions, where these conditions can make
reference to the other agent’s actions. For example, if one agent knows how to lift
his side of the log provided the other agent simultaneously lifts his side, this is
enough to satisfy Tether as I intend it to be read.
The third constraint is intended to capture the explanatory role of joint know-
how. I take it to be a central feature of know-how (whether individual or joint) that
it helps explain an agent’s success in executing his intentions. Admittedly, not all
cases of successful execution are explained by the agent’s know-how. Sometimes,
in the individual case, an agent’s success is explained by aid from others: for
example, suppose, by cutting all the right wires, I successfully execute an intention
to defuse a bomb, but only because a bomb defusal expert provided detailed
instructions by phone.7 This is a case of success in executing my intention, but it
does not manifest know-how on my part beyond that involved in cutting a wire. In
other cases, an agent’s success is accidental: for example, suppose I again defuse a
bomb, this time without help. My success on this occasion is a matter of pure luck: I
just happened to cut all the right wires. Although know-how may sometimes be
explanatory of one-off successes, it is not in this case.
We should not, then, say that know-how always explains an agent’s success in
executing his intentions. What we should say instead is that when an agent reliably
succeeds in performing some intentional action, and does so without aid from
others, the agent’s know-how helps explain this pattern of reliable execution.
Accordingly, I suggest that the explanatory role of joint know-how is to provide an
explanation of why two agents reliably succeed, without external aid, in executing a
joint intention to do J. I will call this constraint Explanation:
Explanation: If S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J, then this provides an
explanation of why they reliably succeed, without aid from others, in
executing their joint intention to do J.8
It is worth emphasizing that this conditional is not a biconditional. If two agents
jointly know how to perform some activity, this should be explanatory of their
reliable success in performing that activity; but there is no implication that, if two
agents reliably succeed in executing a joint intention without aid from others, then
joint know-how must feature in an explanation of their success.
I therefore leave open the possibility that some cases of reliably successful joint
action do not manifest joint know-how. For example, if two agents execute a joint
intention to paint a house, but do so by painting separate rooms on separate days,
their success can be sufficiently explained by citing prior planning, plus the fact that
they individually know how to paint a room. In the terminology of Michael Bratman
7 This example is based on a similar example in Setiya (2012).
8 In contrast to Distribution and Tether, Explanation takes for granted the notion of a joint intention. This
leads to the concern that it may be hard to assess whether a putative account of joint know-how satisfies
this constraint unless we first commit to a particular account of joint intention. In practice, however, we
will find that we do not need to commit to any particular account of joint intention to put the Explanation
constraint to work. We need only assume that a joint intention is present in paradigm cases of joint action,
such as rowing together.
J. Birch
123
(1992, p. 339), this is a case of ‘‘prepackaged cooperation’’ rather than ‘‘shared
cooperative activity’’. My focal cases in this paper are cases of shared cooperative
activity, not prepackaged cooperation. I take it that shared cooperative activity
usually (perhaps always) exercises joint know-how, whereas prepackaged cooper-
ation does not. For Bratman, the difference between shared cooperative activity and
prepackaged cooperation is marked by the presence of ‘‘mutual responsiveness in
action’’ in the former but not the latter. Mutual responsiveness in action is related to
joint know-how, but the relation between them is subtle; I will revisit this issue in
Sect. 5.
3 A simple account (and its inadequacy)
As a starting point, let us consider a simple proposal:9
Simple account:
S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J if and only if:
(1) S1 knows how to perform his assigned role, j1, in conditions c1;
(2) S2 knows how to perform his assigned role, j2, in conditions c2;
(3) c1 and c2 are mutually compatible.
The simple account satisfies Distribution and Tether. As previewed in the discussion
of Tether, the conditions c1 and c2 may make reference to the actions of the other
agent. For example, it may be that John knows how to row in the stern seat only
when a competent rower is sat in the bow seat, and vice versa. The agents need not
know how to do their parts in isolation, or with incompetent partners. What is
crucial is that the conditions each requires for the exercise of his knowledge of how
to do his part are compatible with each other.10
Conditions (1)–(3) in the simple account seem to capture an important aspect of
what it is for S1 and S2 to know jointly how to do J, but they do not suffice. Consider
again the example of the Biglin brothers. Suppose S1 is the rower in the stern seat
(John) and S2 is the rower in the bow seat (Barney). The two roles (j1 and j2) are
rowing in the stern seat and rowing in the bow seat. Suppose that each agent knows
how to perform his part under mutually compatible conditions, so that conditions
(1)-(3) are satisfied. Does this suffice for S1 and S2’s knowing how to row together?
It does not. Intuitively this is because, even granting that (1)–(3) obtain, it may be
that as soon as S1 and S2 begin to row, the boat starts lurching and veering
9 An even simpler account would omit c1, c2, and condition (3). But such an account would lead us to
attribute joint know-how even in cases in which the agents know how to perform their roles only in
mutually incompatible conditions and would be clearly inadequate for this reason.
10 In some cases, an agent may require instruction (or some other form of aid) from the other. The simple
account allows for this possibility (as does the AME account, below). It is simply that, in such cases, the
specification of c1 and/or c2 should incorporate the required aid. This also makes room for the possibility
that two agents may jointly know how to do J even though neither knows how to do his part without aid
from the other.
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waywardly, owing to their performing their roles at different rates or in otherwise
uncoordinated ways, and this seems in conflict with the idea that they know how to
row together. The conditions have missed the crucial point that the agents must
know how to coordinate their individual performances.
We can give a more principled reason why these conditions do not suffice by
referring back to Explanation. If S1 and S2’s joint know-how consisted merely in the
conjunction of S1’s knowing how to row in the stern seat and S2’s knowing how to
row in the bow seat under mutually compatible conditions, their joint know-how
would offer no explanation for their reliably successful execution of their joint
intention to row together. This is because reliable success here, and in shared
cooperative activity more generally, depends on mutual coordination, yet conditions
(1)–(3) offer no explanation of mutual coordination. So these conditions do not, by
themselves, yield an account that satisfies Explanation.
In short, the simple account satisfies Distribution and Tether but not Explanation.
How can we amend the account so that it does? It may be tempting to simply add to
conditions (1)–(3) a fourth condition:
(4) S1 and S2 know how to coordinate their performances.
This seems to capture the crucial missing ingredient. However, it accounts for the
agents’ joint knowledge of how to do J in terms of a further, unanalysed piece of
joint know-how. Given our goal of elucidating the relationship between joint and
individual know-how, this is unsatisfying. The challenge we face is that of
explicating condition (4) in terms of further facts about what the agents individually
know how to do.
4 Knowing how to coordinate
What is involved in two agents knowing how to coordinate in a joint action? First, a
remark on how I think we should not approach this question. There is a substantial
game-theoretic literature on coordination, in which we find, for example, the notion
of a coordination equilibrium. A coordination equilibrium is, roughly, a special type
of Nash equilibrium such that no agent stands to gain an increased payoff when any
agent unilaterally switches strategy. Might the sort of coordination that character-
izes shared cooperative activity be described as the agents attaining a coordination
equilibrium?
I suggest not, for two reasons. First, the notion of a coordination equilibrium is
too thin for my purposes: two agents may achieve such an equilibrium in a game in
which their strategy profile bears little resemblance to a joint action. For example,
suppose two agents, both driving their cars on the left, pass each other in the night
while travelling in opposite directions, without evening so much as a glance in each
other’s direction. This might be modelled as a coordination equilibrium, but it is not
displaying the type of coordination characteristic of joint action. Second, there is
also a sense in which the notion is too demanding, since it requires that coordination
leads to both agents maximizing their personal payoff. Yet personal payoffs need
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not be maximized in a joint action: indeed, there may be no meaningful payoff at
stake. Along these lines, Brian Skyrms (2010, p. 57) writes of the ‘‘game of
inconsequential actions’’, in which all payoffs are zero, and writes ‘‘I believe that
much of life has this structure’’. The type of coordination that concerns me here is
compatible with the joint action being inconsequential in this sense.11
How, then, should we approach this question? As we noted in Sect. 2, Bratman
(1992, 2014) describes ‘‘mutual responsiveness in action’’ as the mark of shared
cooperative activity, and this is a starting point: coordination requires that each
agent in some sense responds to the other. However, as Bratman’s critics have
noted, he does not offer a detailed explication of mutual responsiveness (Gold and
Sugden 2007).12 To put some flesh on the bones of this idea, let us first note three
obvious features of the sort of mutual responsiveness that leads to successful joint
action. First, the responses in question are of a particular kind: they take the form of
adjustments to one’s own performance in light of what one’s cooperative partner is
doing. Second, not just any adjustment will do: cooperating agents adjust their
behaviour so as to avert the failure of the joint action. For example, if two rowers
intend to row in a straight line but are rowing waywardly, they exercise their know-
how when one adjusts his stroke rate to restore synchronicity, removing the
waywardness. Third, these adjustments are not the result of prior planning, but
rather come as a result of predicting and monitoring what the other agent is doing in
real time.13
As the psychological literature on joint action shows, the agents’ monitoring of
each other may take various forms (Vesper et al. 2010). It may take the form of
direct perceptual monitoring of the other agent’s behaviour, but it may also be
mediated by cues and signals that indicate aspects of the other agent’s behaviour.
Indeed, if one compares the performance of experts at a joint action to the
performance of two novices, it is a common phenomenon that the novices make
much heavier use of direct perceptual monitoring than the experts. For example, two
novice dancers may need to watch each other’s feet, and two novice pianists may
need to watch each other’s hands as they play a duet. Experts often do without this
extreme form of direct monitoring, instead relying more heavily on signals and cues.
So far, we have the idea that coordination in the context of joint action consists in
the failure-averting adjustment of the agents’ performances as a result of their
11 The literature on ‘‘team reasoning’’ offers an alternative to orthodox game theory that aims to capture
the distinctive sort of practical reasoning that occurs in the context of joint action (e.g. Bacharach 2006;
Gold and Sugden 2007). Nothing I say here is in tension with that approach, because I have a different
aim: my aim is not to characterize the practical reasoning that leads rational agents to decide to
coordinate, but rather to characterize the know-how exercised when they coordinate.
12 To illustrate mutual responsiveness in action with reference to his focal example of a duet, Bratman
(1992, p. 339) writes: ‘‘I listen closely to when and how you come in, and this helps guide my own
singing; and you are similarly responsive.’’ This foreshadows the ‘‘monitoring’’ component of the account
I develop here, and perhaps the ‘‘adjustment’’ component, but not the ‘‘active enablement’’ component.
13 ‘‘The Biglin Brothers Racing’’ is an illustration of this point. On close inspection, we see the brothers
are slightly out of sync: Barney is slightly ahead of John in his stroke. In the painting, we see him
watching John’s oar—indirectly monitoring his behaviour—with a view to adjusting his own movements
to restore synchronicity.
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prediction and (direct or signal-mediated) monitoring of each other’s behaviour.
However, something important is missing: the effort invested by an agent to make
himself such as to be easily predicted and monitored. Stephen Levinson once
remarked that ‘‘there is an extraordinary shift in our thinking when we start to act
intending that our actions should be coordinated with—then we have to design our
actions so that they are self-evidently perspicuous’’ (1995, p. 241).14 I take this to be
an important insight, and one our account has so far missed. Coordination is not
simply a matter of each agent making adjustments to their performance in response
to that of the other. It is also a matter of each agent, from the outset, acting in such a
way as to actively enable the other agent to make such adjustments. In other words,
each agent performs his role in a way that is actively coordination-enabling for the
other.
What is involved in an actively coordination-enabling performance? Here,
Vesper and et al. (2010) discussion of ‘‘coordination smoothing’’ is particularly
helpful. Vesper et al. note that in many cases, including crew rowing, prediction and
monitoring is substantially easier if the target is able to make his own performance
less variable by, for example, rowing at a steadier rate. Feigean et al. (2017) show
that, when two skilled individual rowers learn to row a coxless pair for the first time,
the rower in the stern position learns to become less variable, producing slower,
larger-amplitude sweeps of the oar at a more constant rate. In other cases, what
matters is the making salient of certain aspects of the performance through subtle
signals. Vesper et al. (2010, p. 1001) give the example of two pianists playing a
duet, using synchronized head movements and pronounced finger raising as a way
of keeping time with each other when they are unable to hear the piano (Goebl and
Palmer 2009).
Inevitably, the means by which predictability and perspicuity is achieved in a
joint action will depend a great deal on the nature of the action in question. I suspect
all that can be said in general about actively coordination-enabling performance is
that it consists of an agent making predictable and perspicuous to the other agent
those aspects of his performance that may call for responsive adjustment—and to do
so not by accident but intentionally, in a way that is appropriately sensitive to the
other agent’s ability to predict, monitor and respond. For our purposes, the
following working definition will be enough:
S1’s performance of j1 is actively coordination-enabling for S2 just in case the
features of the performance that may call for responsive adjustment from S2
are intentionally made predictable and perspicuous to S2, either through the
nature of the performance itself or through the use of signalling.
14 See also Tomasello (2014, p. 58), who also quotes this sentence and further expands on Levinson’s
insight.
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5 The active mutual enablement (AME) account
These considerations lead to a proposal I will call the active mutual enablement
(AME) account of joint know-how:
AME:
S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J if and only if:
(1a) S1 knows how (in conditions c1) to perform j1 in a way that is actively
coordination-enabling for S2.
(1b) S1 knows how to predict, monitor and make failure-averting adjust-
ments in response to S2’s performance of j2, provided S2 performs j2 in
a way that is actively coordination-enabling for S1.
(2a) S2 knows how (in conditions c2) to perform j2 in a way that is actively
coordination-enabling for S1.
(2b) S2 knows how to predict, monitor and make failure-averting adjust-
ments in response to S1’s performance of j1, provided S1 performs j1 in
a way that is actively coordination-enabling for S2.
(3) c1 and c2 are mutually compatible.
The AME account claims that joint know-how is reducible to an interlocking
package of individual know-how states with distinctive and complex objects: each
agent knows how to perform his role in an actively coordination-enabling way for
the other agent while predicting, monitoring, and making responsive adjustments in
response to the other agent’s behaviour.
I contend that the proposed account satisfies our three basic constraints. Like the
simple account, the AME account satisfies Distribution and Tether, and I submit that
it also satisfies Explanation. When agents reliably execute a joint intention to
perform a joint action, it is the relational structure between their individual know-
how states described by AME account—each agent knowing how to actively enable
responsive adjustments from, while making responsive adjustments to, the
performance of the other agent—that explains the reliability of their success in
the face of unforeseen obstacles and challenges.
The complementarity between the AME account and Bratman’s
(1992, 1993, 2014) theory of shared intention should now be clear. Bratman
accounts for shared intention in terms of individual intentions with distinctive,
interlocking objects involving relations to the other agent’s intentions. Very
roughly, each intends that we do J in accordance with and because of what Bratman
terms meshing subplans. Similarly, the AME account characterizes joint know-how
in terms of individual know-how states with distinctive, interlocking objects
involving relations to the other agent’s know-how. Although I have not assumed the
correctness of Bratman’s account of joint intention in constructing the AME
account, the two theories are intended to be complementary.
One disanalogy with Bratman’s theory is worth noting: Bratman’s conditions for
shared intention include a common knowledge requirement, but the AME account
contains no such requirement. It need not be common knowledge that the conditions
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for joint know-how are satisfied. In principle, two agents could jointly know how to
do J even though neither knows that the other satisfies the relevant conditions. There
is room for debate about whether a common knowledge requirement is justified
even in the case of shared intention.15 However, even if we grant that it is, there is
no justification for a corresponding requirement regarding joint know-how. If John
secretly harbours the false belief that Barney is incompetent, this does nothing to
change the fact that, in reality, they know how to row together.
We can also revisit, as promised at the end of Sect. 2, the relationship between
joint know-how and Bratman’s notion of ‘‘mutual responsiveness in action’’. Joint
know-how will often be manifested in the form of mutual responsiveness: agents
will exercise their joint know-how in part by responding to each other. It is possible,
however, for two agents to know how to do something without their know-how
being manifested in this way. Sometimes everything goes so smoothly that no
adjustments are required. If a performance is routine and the conditions favourable,
monitoring may not even be required. Joint know-how, like individual know-how,
can be present but latent. More subtly, agents may manifest their joint know-how in
a non-standard way by intentionally performing a joint action badly (e.g. for
instructional purposes), demonstrating the sort of non-accidental miscoordination
that only two agents who know how to coordinate could reliably achieve.16
Moreover, mutual responsiveness need not be a manifestation of joint know-how,
because it may arise even in cases in which the agents do not know how to perform
the joint action they are attempting. For example, two singers who don’t know how
to sing a duet together may nonetheless listen carefully to each other and adjust their
performances—but not in a way that reliably averts failure. Joint know-how and
mutual responsiveness in action are related but distinct.
6 Objections: narrowness, symmetry and regress
One objection to the AME account is that its conditions are not satisfied in some
cases we might intuitively describe as involving joint know-how. These are cases of
prepackaged cooperation (in Bratman’s sense) in which the agents do not predict,
monitor or respond to each other, but nevertheless cooperate in a sufficiently
intricate way that an ascription of know-how to the pair or group seems intuitive.
Consider, for example, two singers singing a duet together. Suppose that each
knows how to perform her part only if the other performs her part perfectly (so that
no adjustments to the tempo or the pitch of the other singer are necessary) and that
each singer knows how to perform her part perfectly.17 Even though they lack joint
15 Blomberg (2016) argues that the requirement was never well motivated, but see Paternotte (2013) for a
defence of the requirement.
16 As Stanley and Williamson (2017) observe, it is a general feature of skills that they can be manifested
in non-standard ways, such as intentionally poor performance.
17 This example, suggested by an anonymous reviewer, is based on Bratman’s (1992, pp. 336–337) case
of the ‘‘unhelpful singers’’.
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know-how in the sense of the AME account, is it not intuitive to say they know how
to sing the duet together?
It is initially intuitive, I agree. However, small modifications to the example
make the ascription of joint know-how less intuitive. Suppose the two singers are in
adjoining recording studios, unable to hear or see each other. If the intuitiveness of
ascribing joint know-how does not diminish, suppose that they record their parts on
separate days, and in separate locations. The modified example seems like a clear
case of two individuals independently exercising their individual know-how.
Spatiotemporal proximity, mutual audibility or mutual visibility are not necessary
for prepackaged cooperation, even prepackaged cooperation of an intricate and
interweaving nature, but they seem to make a difference to the intuitiveness of an
ascription of joint know-how. Why is that? Because, I suggest, despite the initial
plausibility of joint know-how ascriptions in some cases of prepackaged cooper-
ation, joint know-how requires knowledge of how to enable, monitor and adjust to
the other agent. I suspect that the ascription of joint know-how initially seems
plausible because we conflate a case in which the singers genuinely do not know
how to enable, monitor, or adjust to each other with a superficially similar case in
which this know how is present but latent, because the performances are perfectly
executed.
A different objection derives from the fact that the AME account, like Bratman’s
theory of joint intention, makes symmetric demands of the two agents’ individual
know-how. That is, although the nature of the actions j1 and j2 may differ
considerably, the form of the requirements on each agent’s know-how is the same:
each must know how do his part in an actively coordination-enabling way while
predicting, monitoring and adjusting to the other agent.18 This leads to a potential
concern: is this symmetry always appropriate?
To motivate the concern, consider again the Biglin brothers. Suppose that John,
who sets the stroke rate, knows how to do his part in an actively coordination-
enabling way (he rows steadily, clearly signalling the rate at which he intends to
row) but does not know how to make adjustments to Barney. Suppose, meanwhile,
that Barney knows how to adjust to John—he reliably matches the rate John sets—
but does not know how to actively enable adjustments from John. Would this
asymmetric distribution of know-how suffice for them to know jointly how to row
together? If so, the AME account requires too much: the ‘‘one-way coordination’’
present in this example is already enough.
I contend, however, that one-way coordination is not enough. What is true about
the case of the Biglin brothers is that, because both are experts, there is no need for
John to monitor Barney’s performance directly. Nonetheless, they would not
reliably succeed at executing this demanding joint skill if John were wholly
unresponsive to Barney. Barney must know how to communicate any change in
circumstances (e.g. communicating the need for a change in the stroke rate), and
John must know how to adjust his performance in light of the information received.
18 To put this more precisely, the demands are symmetric in the sense that one could permute the agents
(swapping S1 for S2), the individual actions (swapping j1 for j2) and the conditions (swapping c1 for c2) in
the AME account and thereby arrive at a notationally equivalent account.
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If Barney were wholly uncommunicative, or if John were wholly unable to respond
to information from Barney, I maintain that they would not possess joint know-how.
Their success in executing their joint intention would be reliant on fortuitous
circumstances that did not expose the fragile nature of their coordination.
A third objection concerns an apparent threat of regress that arises when we ask
how joint know-how is acquired. For how can two agents learn how to do J together
unless they already know how to perform some other joint action together? For
example, two capable rowers will normally require a period of joint practice to learn
how to row a coxless pair together.19 If they know immediately how to row
together, this can only be because they have a long history of joint practice with
other, similar partners. It is a virtue of the AME account, not a defect, that it
explains why joint know-how tends to be cultivated through joint practice. The
agents may know how to perform their individual roles from prior individual
practice, but this is not enough to meet the requirements of the account: each must
learn how to make responsive adjustments to the other, and each must learn how to
perform his role in a way that is actively coordination-enabling for the other. While
this mutual attunement of each agent’s individual know-how to that of the other
might in principle be achieved without joint practice, especially when the agents are
already attuned to other partners who behave in similar ways, it is no surprise that
joint practice is often needed.
But here is where the puzzle arises: joint practising of J is itself a joint action.
Given this, how can two agents who do not already know how to do something else
together—namely, how to practise doing J—ever come to possess the joint
knowledge of how to do J? How, in turn, can they ever come to possess the joint
knowledge of how to practise doing J without first knowing how to do something
else together—roughly, how to practise doing some of the elements of J? If the
pattern continues indefinitely, it becomes impossible to see how two such agents
could ever make the initial transition from possessing no joint know-how to
possessing some.
It must be, therefore, that the pattern does not continue indefinitely: instead, it
bottoms out in basic forms of joint know-how that are not acquired through joint
practice, but instead arise from innate or individually learned aspects of general
practical competence.20 This seems less mysterious once one observes that knowing
how to practise doing J is less of an achievement than knowing how to do J. The
success conditions for practising J are more relaxed than the success conditions for
doing J, which makes it easier for the agents’ individual performances to suffice for
success, and also makes it easier for the agents’ adjustments to qualify as failure-
averting. For practising doing some element of J, the success conditions are more
relaxed still, and so on. Eventually, we arrive at basic cooperative activities with
sufficiently relaxed success conditions that any generally competent agents who
form a joint intention to do such an activity can immediately be said to know how to
19 For a detailed account of how practising in a coxless pair modifies the technique of the rowers, as they
learn to be actively coordination-enabling for each other, see Feigean et al. (2017).
20 For discussion of the notion of ‘‘general practical competence’’ on which I rely here, see Railton
(2009).
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do it, without any need for prior practice. For example, two novice rowers who do
not even know how to practise rowing together might still, by virtue of their general
practical competence, know how to practise raising and lowering their oars in time
with one another.
The basic platform of joint know-how that arises from the agents’ general
practical competence thus allows for the acquisition, through joint practice, of more
demanding know-how states. This occurs by means of a familiar ratcheting,
whereby mastering a given level of performance in some joint action makes it
possible to acquire joint knowledge of how to perform at a slightly higher level, and
so on. Two novice rowers who have mastered the synchronized raising and lowering
of their oars can move on to practising whole strokes, while two rowers who know
how to perform whole strokes in time with one another can start learning how to
coordinate their movements more precisely. It is a virtue of the AME account that it
allows for this kind of ratcheting.
7 Intellectualism about joint know-how: the core commitment
In constructing the AME account, I made no assumptions about whether know-how
should, or should not, be interpreted as a species of propositional knowledge. But
having arrived at this account, we can now ask: can joint know-how be interpreted
as joint knowledge of a proposition? The picture here is complicated by the absence
of any agreed theory of joint propositional knowledge. We can ask, however, which
views about joint propositional knowledge are compatible with the reduction of
joint know-how to joint knowledge of a proposition, and which are not. I will
consider (in Sects. 8–10) two such views, both of which share the assumption that
joint propositional knowledge depends closely on individual propositional knowl-
edge, but which disagree about the nature of the dependence.
In the case of individual know-how, the standard bearer for intellectualism is
Jason Stanley (2011), who proposes that an agent knows how to do an individual
action if and only if the agent knows, of some way w with which the agent is
acquainted under a practical mode of presentation, that w is a way in which one
could successfully do that action. To exercise one’s know-how is to implement a
way one knows could lead to success. In slogan form, know-how is knowledge of
counterfactual success.21
We can construct an analogue of Stanley’s intellectualism in the case of joint
know-how. Let (w, v) represent a joint way of performing J, comprising two
individual ways, denoted by w and v, of performing the two individual roles in
J. We should allow here that w and v incorporate ways of making one’s performance
coordination-enabling for the other agent, as well as ways of predicting, monitoring
and adjusting to the other agent’s behaviour. In other words, w and v are to be
understood not as ways of performing individual actions without regard to the other
21 For recent discussion of this and related proposals, see Setiya (2012), Fridland (2013, 2014), Carter
and Pritchard (2015), Santorio (2016) and Pavese (2015, 2017).
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agent, but as ways of fully satisfying requirements (1) and (2), respectively, of the
AME account. The core commitment of Stanley-style intellectualism as applied to
joint know-how is that joint know-how is joint knowledge of counterfactual success.
We can express this core commitment as follows:
Intellectualism about joint know-how: S1 and S2 know jointly how to do J if
and only if S1 and S2 jointly know, of some joint way (w, v), that (w, v) is a
way of successfully doing J.
I have omitted a joint-level analogue of Stanley’s requirement that the agent is
acquainted with the way under a ‘‘practical mode of presentation’’ (or ‘‘guise’’, or
‘‘way of thinking’’). This is because, even if this notion can be made sufficiently
precise in the case of individual action, it remains unclear what the joint-level
analogue of this requirement should be, and this complication does not matter to my
arguments in Sect. 8.22 I will, however, revisit this omission in due course, since it
provides the intellectualist with a possible escape route from the objection presented
in Sect. 9.
8 Summative intellectualism
The core commitment of intellectualism about joint know-how can be combined
with different views on the nature of joint propositional knowledge to yield
substantially different versions of intellectualism. One version, which I will here
call summative intellectualism, conjoins the intellectualist’s core commitment with
a summativist view of joint propositional knowledge, on which a pair of agents can
be said to know only that which both agents know individually. The result is the
following view:
Summative intellectualism: S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J only if both
agents individually know, of some joint way (w, v), that (w, v) is a way of
successfully doing J.
There is an intuitive tension between summative intellectualism and Distribution,
which I introduced in Sect. 2 as a basic constraint on any acceptable account of joint
know-how. Recall that, according to Distribution, joint know-how does not require
that each agent knows how to perform both roles in the joint action. Assuming for
the sake of argument that intellectualism about individual know-how is correct,
Distribution implies that, for two agents to know jointly how to do J, it need not be
the case that either agent knows, for both roles, a way of performing that role. This
is not logically incompatible with summative intellectualism, but an incompatibility
is generated by adding one further plausible assumption that I will call
Decomposability: an agent individually knows that (w, v) is a way of successfully
22 For criticism of the notion of a ‘‘practical mode of presentation’’, see Noe¨ (2005), Stalnaker (2012) and
Glick (2015). For a recent defence, see Pavese (2015).
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doing J only if the agent individually knows that w is a way of successfully
performing j1 and that v is a way of successfully performing j2.
In short, the argument against summative intellectualism, from Distribution,
Decomposability and individual-level intellectualism, is as follows:
(1) Intellectualism about individual know-how: S1 knows how to do j1 if and only
if S1 knows, of some way w, that w is a way of successfully performing j1.
(2) Decomposability: S1 knows that (w, v) is a way of successfully doing J only if
S1 knows that w is a way of successfully performing j1 and that v is a way of
successfully performing j2.
(3) Distribution: If S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J, it need not be true, of
either agent, that he individually knows how to perform both roles in J.
(4) Therefore (from 1 to 3): If S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J, it need not be
true, of either agent, that he individually knows that (w, v) is a way of
successfully doing J.
This argument puts the summative intellectualist in a difficult position. To be of any
plausibility, summative intellectualism about joint know-how must be combined
with intellectualism about individual know-how. Thus the summative intellectualist
must choose between two unattractive options: reject Distribution, a constraint
motivated by reflection on paradigm cases of joint action (see Sect. 2); or else reject
Decomposability, and maintain that an individual can know a proposition
concerning the counterfactual success of a joint way of acting without knowing
the corresponding propositions about the counterfactual success of the individual
ways of acting from which the joint way is composed.
Note here that this problem in no way depends on the precise details of the AME
account. The source of the problem is Distribution, and it will arise given any
account of the relationship between joint and individual know-how that satisfies
Distribution.
9 Distributive intellectualism
I take it, then, that a more promising option for the intellectualist is to reject the
summativist view of joint propositional knowledge in favour of a view on which
joint propositional knowledge, like joint know-how, can be distributed between the
participants in a joint action. The intuitive idea here is that, for two agents to jointly
know that p, it need not be the case that either one individually knows that p: it may
be enough that a hypothetical observer with full access to the propositional
knowledge of both individuals could reasonably infer p from the set of truths known
to at least one of them. This is not to deny that joint propositional knowledge is
closely tied to individual propositional knowledge, but it allows the ties to be
somewhat looser than the summativist view allows. This leads to a view which I
will call distributive intellectualism:
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Distributive intellectualism: S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J if and only if
the proposition that (w, v) is a way of successfully doing J can be reasonably
inferred from the set of propositions individually known by S1 or S2.
23
That joint propositional knowledge can indeed be distributed between agents in this
way is made independently plausible by cases of joint memory (Barnier et al. 2008;
Sutton et al. 2010).24 For example, Harris et al. (2014) investigated, through tests
and interviews, the extent to which remembering as a couple facilitates or inhibits
recall. Joint remembering, while not always beneficial, appears to facilitate the
recall of episodic and qualitative detail. For example, in one interview, a couple
were able to remember the name of a show they had seen on a particular occasion,
even though neither could remember the name individually (see Harris et al. 2014,
pp. 291–292). The husband remembered that the show they had seen starred John
Hanson, and the wife remembered that they had seen a show starring John Hanson
that was called The Desert Song. We can plausibly interpret this as a case in which
the couple knew jointly that they had seen The Desert Song on the occasion in
question, but neither knew individually until they had actively integrated their
individual knowledge. Examples of this sort motivate (independently of any
considerations relating to know-how) an account of joint propositional knowledge
that does not require a jointly known proposition to be individually known by either
agent, and that allows a proposition to be jointly known when it may be inferred
from the propositions each agent individually knows.25
Distributive intellectualism is thus more credible at face value than summative
intellectualism. Agents who satisfy all the conditions of the AME account will, if we
assume the truth of individual-level intellectualism, individually know a package of
propositions concerning ways of performing their roles, ways of enabling
coordination in each other, and ways of monitoring and adjusting to each other’s
performance. It is not implausible that, when all these conditions are satisfied, the
proposition that (w, v) is a way of successfully doing J could be inferred from all
that they individually know.
However, distributive intellectualism still faces a significant problem. The
problem is that there are cases in which two agents jointly know how to perform a
joint action while believing that the joint way they implement is one that could not
lead to success. For a vivid example, consider anti-phase rowing. In traditional
rowing, the rowers aim for perfect synchrony with each other. This leads to cyclical
23 The difference between summative and distributive versions of intellectualism maps on to a more
general division between summative and distributive approaches to collective knowledge and belief. For
an introduction to the general issue, see Lackey (2014).
24 See Bird (2014) for arguments that propositional knowledge can also be distributed across larger
groups.
25 An account of joint propositional knowledge that, in my view, meshes even better with these results is
one on which two agents know jointly all and only those propositions which they know how to infer,
through communication with each other, from their stock of individual propositional knowledge.
However, such an account explicitly makes joint know-how prior to joint propositional knowledge. Such
a view is not available to the intellectualist, who must hold that joint propositional knowledge is prior to
joint know-how. Thus distributive intellectualism should not be formulated in these terms.
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velocity fluctuations that undermine efficiency: the boat slows, then speeds up, then
slows, and so on. A way to maintain smooth velocity is to row in perfect anti-phase.
This is very difficult to achieve, but experiments using coupled rowing machines
have shown that there is the potential for significant power benefits if coordination
can be maintained (de Brouwer et al. 2013; Cuijpers et al. 2015; de Poel et al. 2016).
Imagine, then, the following case. Two skilled, experienced rowers row in phase
together in a coxless double,26 exercising their joint knowledge of how to row
together. Now an experimenter asks them to start rowing anti-phase. They are
highly sceptical of this instruction. They believe that, as soon as they try it, the boat
will become unbalanced, wayward and slow. They sincerely believe a boat cannot
be rowed like this. As a matter of fact, however, the agents fully satisfy the
conditions of the AME account with respect to anti-phase rowing. By virtue of their
existing skill and experience, each knows how to do his part while monitoring and
adjusting to the other, and enabling such monitoring and adjustment from the other.
The two rowers already know how to row anti-phase, despite disbelieving that the
method can work. As a result, all goes well: they maintain anti-phase coordination,
and the boat continues to glide through the water and at a smoother velocity than
before.
Consider the rowers’ state of mind at the moment the experimenter gives the
instruction. I contend that at this moment (a) the two rowers jointly know how to
row anti-phase by virtue of their existing competence and manifest this joint know-
how in their subsequent action; but that (b) neither agent believes that what they are
about to do is a way of rowing together that could lead to success. Indeed, both
agents believe themselves, falsely, to be preparing to implement a joint way that is
guaranteed to fail as a way of rowing together.
I take this example to show that a pair of skilled agents may possess joint
knowledge of how to do J even though both agents individually believe, of the way
in which they know how to do J, that it cannot lead to success.27 The example
refutes distributive intellectualism given the following additional assumption, which
I will call Exclusion:
Exclusion: If both S1 and S2 individually believe that not-p, then they do not
jointly know that p.
Again, the options for the intellectualist look unattractive. The distributive
intellectualist may either deny Exclusion, an assumption that merely rules out an
extreme kind of tension between joint and individual belief,28 or else deny the
possibility of two agents jointly knowing how to do something while believing that
the technique they jointly implement cannot succeed.
26 In a double, as opposed to a pair, both rowers hold two oars. This is more stable under anti-phase
rowing than a pair.
27 The possibility of such examples is related to the absence of a common knowledge requirement
regarding joint know-how, as discussed in Sect. 5.
28 This radical decoupling of individual from joint or collective belief has at least one notable defender:
Gilbert (1987, 2005). It is not an absurd or obviously indefensible option—just an unattractive one.
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10 Practical modes of presentation
The idea of a mismatch between an agent’s avowed beliefs and know-how is not
unique to the case of joint action. Brownstein and Michaelson (2016) consider
various cases in which an agent appears to know how to perform some individual
action while believing, of the way he implements, that it cannot lead to success.
However, as Brownstein and Michaelson (2016, p. 2830) acknowledge, the
intellectualist can seek to account for these examples by positing beliefs held under
a practical mode of presentation that contradict the agent’s avowed beliefs (Stanley
and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011, Ch. 4). I may believe of a way w, presented
under a theoretical guise, that it could not lead to success, and yet know of that same
way, presented under a practical guise, that it could lead to success.
Consider, for example, a way of cricket batting that involves looking ahead of the
ball rather than at it. It is well known that cricketers almost always deny that this
way of batting, presented under a theoretical guise, actually works. But eye-tracking
studies show that successful batters do indeed look ahead of the ball.29 The
intellectualist will seek to handle such cases by arguing that the batter knows of that
same way of batting, presented under a practical guise, that it is a way of batting
successfully.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that this move works in the individual case.
Could a similar move rescue distributive intellectualism in the joint case? We could
grant that our rowers (like the cricket batters) both believe, of a joint way with
which they are acquainted under a theoretical mode of presentation (i.e. anti-phase
rowing), that it could not lead to success. But we could maintain that, nevertheless,
they jointly know of that same way, with which they are jointly acquainted under a
practical mode of presentation, that it is a way in which they could successfully row
anti-phase.
To make this work, we need to say what is required for two agents to be ‘‘jointly
acquainted under a practical mode of presentation’’ with a way of performing a joint
action. If joint acquaintance requires past experience of implementing this particular
joint action together, our rowers do not have it. But perhaps this is too strong a
requirement. A more liberal conception of joint acquaintance requires only that each
agent is individually acquainted, under a practical mode of presentation, with a way
of performing his own role (where, as before, the ‘‘way’’ in question is understood
to encompass all the actions required by the AME account, and not just performance
of an action without regard for the other agent). The rowers in our example might
then be said to be jointly acquainted under a practical mode of presentation with a
way of successfully rowing anti-phase, despite never having done so.
This more sophisticated version of distributive intellectualism can be formulated
as follows:
Distributive intellectualism*:
29 See Mann et al. (2013). This example is discussed in detail by Brownstein and Michaelson (2016,
p. 2822).
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i. S1 and S2 jointly know how to do J if and only if they jointly know, of
some way (w, v) with which they are jointly acquainted under a practical
mode of presentation, that (w, v) is a way of successfully doing J.
ii. They are jointly acquainted with (w, v) under a practical mode of
presentation if and only if at least one agent is individually acquainted
with w under a practical mode of presentation and at least one agent is
individually acquainted with v under a practical mode of presentation.
iii. They jointly know that (w, v) is a way of successfully doing J if and only
if this proposition can be reasonably inferred from the set of propositions
individually known by S1 or S2.
This provides a potential escape route for the distributive intellectualist. Agents who
satisfy all the conditions of the AME account may be regarded as jointly knowing,
of a joint way with which they are acquainted under a practical mode of
presentation, that it is a joint way that would lead to success. Strictly speaking, the
principle a Stanley-style intellectualist must deny is not Exclusion as formulated in
Sect. 9, but rather Exclusion*:
Exclusion*: If both S1 and S2 individually believe, under a theoretical mode of
presentation, that not-p, then they do not jointly know, under a practical mode
of presentation, that p.
The denial of Exclusion* is not such a bitter pill for intellectualists to swallow,
especially since they must already swallow a similar pill to handle cases of
belief/know-how mismatch in the case of individual action. To be clear, however,
the escape route is open only to the distributive form of intellectualism. The
summative form remains implausible for the reasons given in Sect. 8.
11 Open questions
The AME account, and the above considerations on its relationship to intellectu-
alism, provide a starting point for further investigation of the nature, evolutionary
origin and scaling-up of joint know-how. Although I cannot do justice to these
topics here, I will offer some brief reflections in the hope of generating further
debate.
Let us first consider the question of origins. Can chimpanzees possess joint know-
how? They undoubtedly meet some of the necessary conditions: they often know
how to make adjustments to the behaviour of others in contexts such as hunting.
However, I doubt that they know how to act in actively coordination-enabling ways
in the above sense. For this requires advanced mindreading: it requires an
understanding of how others are likely to respond to one’s own performance—what
others will see, what they are able to predict, the inferences they are likely to make,
and the ways they are likely to adjust their behaviour in response. Language is not a
pre-requisite, but it is one of the many ways in which humans demonstrate their
vastly greater capacity for ‘‘acting so as to be coordinated with’’. It seems likely that
chimpanzees have some capacity for mindreading (Krupenye et al. 2016), although
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this remains a source of some controversy (Heyes 2017). But it seems much less
likely that they know how to act in ways that are actively coordination-enabling for
their cooperative partners.
If this is right, then the evolution of joint know-how is part of the story of
hominin evolution, post-dating our divergence from the other great apes. It is
entangled, in ways we have not yet begun to explore, with the evolution of joint
intention, mindreading and language. Unpicking these threads is an important
direction for future work.
What about scaling up? I have left open the question of how the AME account
may (or may not) scale up to larger feats of cooperation. The account extends
naturally enough to small-scale cooperative activities involving more than two
agents: for an activity involving three agents, for example, one can readily imagine
an extended account requiring that each agent knows how to perform his part in a
way that is actively coordination-enabling for the other two, while predicting and
monitoring what the other two are doing and making failure-averting adjustments.
However, this strategy only gets us so far. In particular, the account does not
straightforwardly extend to cover the know-how manifested by paradigm cases of
‘‘group agents’’—institutions, corporations, and so on—of the sort analysed by List
and Pettit (2011). If we say, for example, that Apple knows how to make large
profits, this is not a case of know-how that may be readily explicated in terms of
individual agents individually knowing how to monitor each other and make
adjustments: something qualitatively different is going on here.30
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that there are connections
between the know-how of a group agent and the joint (or shared) know-how of pairs
(or larger subsets) of individuals within the group. After all, small-scale cooperative
activities often form a vital component of the lower-level machinery by means of
which the actions of a group agent are realized: Apple’s profit-making, for example,
depends on the collaborative activities of subsets of its employees. These
connections are worthy of further exploration.
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